5. Column and Line in the Peninsula (3)
The Swarm Attack and the Application of Superior Numbers
When the generals of the Revolution threw away the old linear tactics learned in the school of Frederick the Great, as inapplicable to troops that could not manoeuvre with the same speed and accuracy as their enemies, the improvised system that succeeded was a simple and a wasteful one, but had the merit of permitting them to use their superiority of numbers. It consisted in throwing at the hostile front a very thick skirmishing line, which sheltered and concealed a row of columns of the heaviest sort. The idea was that the first line of tirailleurs would so engage the enemy and keep him occupied, that the supporting columns would get up to striking distance with practically no loss, and could be hurled, while still intact, upon the hostile first line, which they would pierce by their mere impetus and weight, since they were only exposed to fire for a very few minutes, and could endure the loss suffered in that short time without losing their elan or their pace.
The essential part of this system was the enormously thick and powerful skirmishing line. Whole battalions were dispersed in chains of tirailleurs, who frankly abandoned any attempt at ordered movement, took refuge behind cover of all sorts, but were so numerous that they could always drive in the very thin skirmishing line of the enemy, and get closely engaged with his whole front. The orderly battalion fire of the Austrian or other allied troops opposed to them did comparatively little harm to these swarms, who were taking cover as much as possible and presented no closed body or solid mark for the volleys poured at them.
There is a very clear description of such a fight in Ditfurth’s narrative of the Battle of Hondeschoote, where Walmoden’s Hanoverians, covering the Duke of York’s flank, fought for four hours against a swarm of tirailleurs, who always gave way and took refuge in hedges or buildings when attacked by the bayonet, but always came back to molest the defensive line opposed to them, till after clearing their front eleven times the Hanoverians had to give way in the end, because their original three-deep line had simply been shot to pieces, and about a third of their men had fallen.
It looks as if the proper remedy against such a swarm attack would have been local and partial cavalry charges, made by isolated squadrons in support of the attacked infantry line. For nothing could have been more vulnerable by a sudden cavalry charge than a disorderly chain of light troops. On many occasions in the campaigns of 1793–4 the French infantry had shown itself very helpless against horsemen, when it had been caught in circumstances where it could not form square. But this particular remedy against the swarm-attack does not seem to have been tried on the crucial occasions, and many parts of Flanders are so cut up with small enclosures that the use of cavalry as a general remedy might have often proved difficult. The masses which supported the tirailleurs were formed either in columns of companies or columns of divisions. In the former case the eight companies, three deep, stood one behind the other, with a total depth of twenty-four men. In the latter the front of the battalion was formed by a “division”, i.e. two companies, so that the depth was only twelve.
In either case none but the two front men of the line of the leading company, or division, could use their fire-arms, and the rest were useless save for the impetus which they gave to the rolling mass. But such a column, when properly sheathed by the skirmishing line till the last moment, generally came with a very effective rush against the heavily engaged and often already depleted line of allied troops opposed to it. It is equally clear that without its screen of tirailleurs it would have been a very clumsy and expensive instrument of war, since it combined the minimum of shooting power with the maximum of vulnerability. But fortunately for the generals of the French Republic they had to fight against elderly officers of the XVIIIth-century school, who clung to the idea of covering every point, and habitually extended their armies over fronts of such an exaggerated length that the line was generally very thin. An enemy who attacked with heavy masses at a decisive spot, while leaving the rest of the hostile line “contained” by an adequate force, had a fair chance of penetrating, though the process of penetration might be costly to the troops forming the head of the column.
The best early summary of this change of tactics which I have seen occurs in an anonymous English pamphlet Character of the Armies of the Various European Powers, published in 1802, which puts the matter in a nutshell:
‘The French Army was composed of troops of the line without order, and of raw and inexperienced volunteers. They experienced defeats in the beginning, but war in the meantime was forming both officers and soldiers. In an open country they took to forming their armies in columns instead of lines, which they could not preserve without difficulty. They reduced battles to attacks on certain points, where brigade succeeded brigade, and fresh troops supplied the place of those who were driven back, till they were enabled to force the post, and make the enemy give way. They were fully aware that they could not give battle in regular order, and sought to reduce engagements to important affairs of posts. This plan has succeeded. They look upon losses as nothing, provided they succeed in the end; they set little value on their men, because they have the certainty of being able to replace them, and the customary superiority of their numbers affords them an advantage which can only be counterbalanced by great skill, conduct, and activity.”
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