5. Column and Line in the Peninsula (5)
The Development of the British Light Infantry
In fact, it appears that Napoleon preferred the ordre mixte, the alternation of battalions in line and battalions in columns, in those parts of the field where he was wishing to contain” the enemy and to hold him in check, while pure columns, whose way was prepared rather by artillery fire than by a thick skirmishing line, were used at the decisive points where the penetration of the hostile line was intended to take place. If I remember aright Davoust’s “refused” wing at Austerlitz, Masséna’s “refused” wing at Wagram, fought in the ordre mixte, as did Lobau and the 6th Corps at Waterloo. In all these cases the corps named were intended to occupy the enemy in front of them, and to fight a defensive or “containing” battle, while the decision was made by a great attack in column on another section of the field. But apparently Lannes at Jena and Victor at Friedland, who were real “striking units”, also used this formation in attack. Indeed the Emperor recommends it as a general device in a dispatch addressed to Soult before Austerlitz, to be used “autant que faire se pourra”. See: Napoleon to Soult, November 26, 1805, Correspondence 9527.
It is interesting to note that less than a week after, that marshal, having to strike the main blow in the great battle, did not use the plan at all, but fought throughout his attack with his battalions in columns of divisions, for he particularly mentions this in his report to the Emperor. See Dumoulin’s Précis d’Histoire Militaire, x, 263, and Colin, Tactique et Discipline, lxxxv. Whatever may have been the Emperor’s theoretical preference for the ordre mixte, his most celebrated battle-strokes seem generally to have been made by very gross and heavy masses. The worst instances, Macdonald’s column at Wagram and D’Erlon’s first disposition at Waterloo, both perfectly monstrous formations in the way of depth, were not ordered or authorized by the Emperor, but it is clear that in many other cases the advance in solid undeployed masses was permitted or approved by him. The ordre mixte was only a “counsel of perfection”. At its best it was still a very heavy formation.
Having described, perhaps in too much detail, the tactical development of the French system from 1792 to 1808, it remains to inquire what English observers had made of it. The first reflections on the new type of war upon this side of the Channel seem to have been mainly inspired by the experiences of the Duke of York’s army in 1793–4, when the thick chains of tirailleurs which formed the front line of the French array did so much damage to troops which fought them in the old three-deep line, without any adequate counter-provision of skirmishers. We find ere long complaints that the British force had no sufficient proportion of light troops, that the one light company per battalion was wholly insufficient to keep oft a French attack from pressing close up to the main line, and doing damage to it before the real struggle had begun.
Two remedies were proposed. The first was that the proportion of light companies to a battalion should be increased from one to two. Sir James Sinclair in his Observations of the Military System of Great Britain so far as Respects the Formation of Infantry deals with this at length, and proposes to have 160 light infantry to each battalion of 640 men. The second was that in each company of the regiment a certain proportion of men should be selected for good marksmanship and taught light infantry duty, while remaining attached to their companies.
Of these two propositions the first was never tried, but the second was actually practised by certain colonels, who trained fifteen or twenty men per company as skirmishers: these were called “flankers”. The only British battle where I find them specially mentioned, however, is Maida, and their mention here points out the danger of the system. Generals wanting more light troops habitually purloined the light companies of battalions to make separate “light battalions”. But not only did they do this, but sometimes they even stole the “flankers” also from the centre companies. In Stuart’s force that fought at Maida were present not only the light companies but also the “flankers” of regiments left behind in Sicily, which had therefore been deprived of every single marksman that they possessed—an execrable device. The system was only tentative, however, and soon disappeared.
But there was a second alternative course open to the British: instead of developing more skirmishers, in each battalion, they might create new light infantry corps, or turn whole units of the line into light troops. Both of these devices were tried. There were old precedents for the first in the War of the American Rebellion, where the British generals had, of necessity, embodied corps of riflemen to oppose to the deadly marksmen from the backwoods who formed the most efficient part of an American army. But all these Rangers, etc., had been disbanded after 1783, and the system had to begin de novo. It does not seem to have been set going till very late; it was not till 1798 that the first British Rifle battalion was created, to wit, the fifth battalion of the 60th or Royal Americans, which was formed as a Jager corps out of the remnants of many defunct foreign light corps in the British pay, and remained largely German in composition for many years after.
This was the first green-coated battalion; the second was Coote Manningham’s Experimental Rifle Corps, formed in January 1800 and finally taken into the service, after some vicissitudes, as the 95th, a name famous in Peninsular annals, though now almost forgotten under the newer title of the “Rifle Brigade”. The regiment was enlarged to three battalions before it came under Wellington’s hands. Later on, though the number of rifle corps was not increased, yet an addition was made to the light troops of the British Army by turning certain picked battalions into light infantry. They were armed with a special musket of light weight, not a rifle, and all the companies equally were instructed in skirmishing work. There were also some changes made in the uniform; the officers in some corps were given pelisses similar to those worn by hussars—surely a very uncomfortable and encumbering garment for men who were supposed to be specially intended for wood and hedgerow fighting!
The first unit transformed was the 90th, or Perthshire Volunteers, which received the title of a light infantry regiment in 1794. The precedent, however, was not acted upon again till the 43rd and 52nd, the famous regiments of the Peninsular Light Division, were made light infantry in 1803. The last additions during the period of the Napoleonic Wars were the 68th and 85th in 1808, and the 51st and 71st in 1809. Most of these corps had two battalions, but, even so, the provision of light infantry was very small for an army which at that time had nearly 200 battalions embodied.
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