5. Column and Line in the Peninsula (9)
The Third Postulate of Wellington’s Line Formation
We now reach the third postulate of Wellington’s system—the two-deep fighting line must be covered on its flanks, either by the ground, or by cavalry and artillery support, or by infantry prolonging the front beyond the enemy’s immediate point of action. At Vimeiro, Wellesley had got his left wing so cleverly concealed that the French attempt to turn him was itself outflanked. At Talavera one of his wings was covered by a precipitous hill, the other by thick olive plantations. At Bussaco both the French attacks were hopelessly outflanked on each side, so that they could only strike frontally. At Salamanca the 3rd division, the striking force which won the battle, had its line covered on its outward flank by an English and a Portuguese brigade of cavalry. At Vittoria the whole French army was enveloped by the concentric and converging attack of the much longer British line.
Only once, as far as I know, did the French get on to the flank of Wellington’s fighting-line, and cause him trouble. This was at Fuentes de Oñoro, where the 7th division suffered some loss by being taken in flank by outlying French cavalry, and only escaped worse disaster because one battalion (the Chasseurs Britanniques) had time to adapt itself to the situation, and because a few British squadrons sacrificed themselves in stopping the enemy’s superior horse. But there was one instance during the war which demonstrates clearly the terrible risk that the line might run, if it was not properly protected.
At Albuera, Colborne’s brigade of the 2nd division was thrown into action with its flank absolutely bare—there was no support within half a mile—by the recklessness of its divisional general, William Stewart. It was caught in flank by two regiments of French light cavalry, and absolutely cut to pieces, with a loss of 1,200 men out of 1,600 present. Wellington would never have sent it forward without the proper support for its wings, and it is noteworthy that later in that same day Cole took the 4th division into action on the same hill and against the same enemy, with perfect success, because he had guarded one flank with a battalion in square, and the other with a second square and a brigade of cavalry.
These, then, were the necessary postulates required for the successful use of line against column, and, when they were duly borne in mind, victory was secure with any reasonable balance of numbers. The essential fact that lay below the oft-observed conclusion was simply that the two-deep line enabled a force to use every musket with effect, while the column of divisions put seven-ninths of the men forming it in a position where they could not shoot at all, and even the ordre mixte praised by Napoleon placed from seven-twelfths to two-thirds of the rank and file in that same unhappy condition. If the ordre mixte was formed by a regiment of three battalions of 900 men each, only 720 out of 2,700 were in the first two ranks. If by a regiment of four battalions—two deployed, two in column on the flanks—the slightly better result of 1,320 men out of 3,600 able to use their muskets would result.
But Albuera is the only fight in the war in which I have definite proof that the enemy fought in the ordre mixte, with deployed battalions and battalions in column alternately ranged in his front. Usually he came on in columns of divisions to the critical moment, and not unfrequently he had battalion behind battalion in each regiment. It was a gross order of fighting: but d’Erlon invented a worse and more clumsy formation at Waterloo, where he sent forward whole divisions with eight or nine battalions deployed one behind the other, so as to produce a front of 200 men and a depth of twenty-four—with only one man in twelve able to use his musket!
Normally, however, columns of divisions (double-companies) were the French order, i.e. a battalion of 900 men in six companies had a front of one hundred muskets, and 200 men in all able to fire, while 700 were in the rear ranks, able to be shot but not to shoot. If an English battalion of equal strength lay in front, in its two-deep line, it gave a discharge of 900 muskets against one of 200; and this was not all. Its front was four times that of the French battalion, so that its fire lapped round the flanks of the advancing mass, and struck men in the rear ranks, demoralizing them because they had no power to reply. Often the British line, during the moments of fire-combat, threw forward its wings in a converging half-moon, and blazed into three sides of the column at once.
This was done with great effect by the 43rd and 52nd at Bussaco against the French brigade (that of Simon), which came up the slope in front of them, battalion behind battalion, in the most vulnerable array. How could it be expected that the unhappy column could prevail? Effective against an enemy who allowed himself to be cowed and shaken by the sight of the formidable advancing mass, it was helpless against steady troops, who stood their ground and emptied their muskets as fast as they could load into a mark which it was impossible to miss.
To obtain a deluxe leatherbound edition of STUDIES ON THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, subscribe to Castalia History.