3. The Battle of Maida (4)
Reynier’s Swift March and Stuart’s Rapid Response
So he threw 632 men from the 1st and 42nd into Reggio, and 281 of the 23rd into the Castle of Scilla, with a small contingent of artillery, and marched with 4,122 men remaining of these regiments, and his horse battery and two squadrons of cavalry, along the coast road to Maida. At Palmi he picked up the Swiss battalion 630 strong; at Tropea the 1st Polish battalion; at Monteleone the second—the one whose detachment had skirmished with Oswald on the 3rd—which gave him 1,600 men more. The Chasseur squadron from Catanzaro also rode across the peninsula and joined him, so that he had now his whole army assembled, save the one Polish battalion in the north and the garrisons that he had chosen to leave at Scilla and Reggio; 7,000 of his total of 9,000 men were mobilized. He depleted himself, however, of a few additional men by leaving them at Tropea and Monteleone, as posts of connection, to keep him in communication with his southern garrisons—half a battalion of Poles and half a squadron of Chasseurs, 470 bayonets and 100 sabres. This reduced his fighting force to 6,440 men, though he underrated their numbers in his report, calling them a little over 5,000 in one place, 5,150 in another, and finally 5,360 in a third passage of his long report. There is no doubt, however, that 6,440 is the right number. The troops at Tropea and Monteleone he obviously thought would be useful for keeping down local Calabrese insurrection while he went, as he frankly confessed, with complete confidence to drive the English into the sea.
The field force, then, consisted of six French battalions or 4,122 men—the battalions averaging nearly 700 men, one Swiss battalion of 630 men and two weak Polish battalions with 937 men, each of these last having left a company or so at Tropea or Monteleone. The cavalry was about 328 sabres, the artillery consisted of one horse battery with sixty-two men. There were 311 men of the sappers and artillery train. The total made 6,440 of all arms and ranks, and the two infantry brigades were commanded by Compère, who had the 1st Léger and 42nd, and Digonet, who led the 23rd Léger, the Swiss, and the Poles. The cavalry were under Peyri.
Reynier’s march from Reggio to Maida had been very swift. The distance is about eighty miles, and he had covered it in three days, a fine achievement over bad Calabrian roads in scorching weather. In the corresponding three days Stuart had done no more than get his men ashore and seize Nicastro, which was only five miles from his landing-place. On the evening of July 3rd the two armies discovered each other; Stuart reconnoitring in person across the shore plain, with a company of grenadiers, perceived the French army just taking up its position on the heights below the village of San Pietro de Maida; Reynier ranging about with forty chasseurs à cheval saw the large British encampment on the shore; Bunbury says that the generals nearly met, having passed through the same thicket on the plain of Santa Eufemia within ten minutes of each other.
Next morning both sides, being equally confident, prepared to advance. Reynier thought he was strong enough to drive Stuart into the sea. Stuart had been told that Reynier had little over 3,000 men, and had not yet been joined by his outlying troops. If the one had not advanced the other would have done so; but Stuart started first, at daybreak, leaving four companies of de Watteville’s regiment and three of his six field pieces to guard his camp on the shore, at the Bastione de Malta. Deducting this small force of 300 men, and the 20th regiment, which (except its grenadier and light companies) had not yet arrived, the British force consisted of pretty nearly 4,400 men, officers included. Stuart marched them in two columns along the shingly beach which separated his landing place from the French camp below Maida. Kempt’s light brigade led the inland column, with Cole’s behind him; Acland led the inshore column, with Oswald following; the three field-guns were with this column; each brigade had two mule guns with it. As long as they were on the actual beach line Sidney Smith followed with the Apollo frigate and two other vessels, to cover the flank of the marching columns with his fire, in case the French should come down and fight close to the water, intending to drive the British force actually into the sea.
Stuart’s purpose, as stated in his dispatch, was to attack the French camp on the heights of Maida, unless he was himself assailed meanwhile on the march. Reynier’s position, he observes, was good, the front being protected by the shallow stream of the Lamato (everywhere fordable but still an impediment), while its flanks, especially that on the French right, were covered by thick underwood, impervious to formed troops. The left flank seemed the weaker point, and it was this that Stuart intended to attack, forcing the enemy, unless he should decide to fght in the plain, to form front to flank, in order to receive the British attack. The march of nine miles along the beach was very fatiguing, the column being compelled to shuffle along ankle-deep in shingle. The grenadier battalion, who had garrisoned Nicastro and had marched back five miles to join the main force, was especially jaded. It was a hot morning, so hot that there was a certain amount of mirage on the plain, and nothing could be made out clearly. The only touch with the enemy was produced by the fact that parties of French horse were continually seen riding parallel to the flank of Kempt’s (the left) column.
On reaching the mouth of the little river Lamato, Stuart had to change his direction and wheel inland, in order to approach (and outflank) the French position. This movement took him out of the protection of the guns of Sidney Smith’s vessels, which could no longer help him when he turned inshore The brigades now advanced in echelon, Kempt leading, then Acland, the late head of the inshore column, then Cole. Oswald, who was to form the reserve, with his weak force of eight companies of the 58th and four of de Watteville’s regiment, only 850 men, was placed behind the interval between Cole and Acland. He had (as already mentioned) the three field guns with him. The march of two miles from the beach towards the French camp was far more fatiguing than the first seven miles, for the Lamato spreads out into marshes at its estuary, there was no road, save a track followed by Kempt, and many of the battalions were ankle-deep in black slime.
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