PREAMBLE
Just when the United States of America faces defeat in the geopolitical war in Gaza, and a faltering Ukraine war, (Indian Punchline), in Beijing Arab envoys sought a group meeting with Special Envoy Zhai Jun to underscore their collective stance that a “very severe” humanitarian crisis has emerged following Israel’s attack on Gaza and that “the international community has the responsibility to take immediate actions to ease the tension, promote the resumption of talks for peace, and safeguard the Palestinian people’s lawful national rights,” besides to provide conditions for relieving the humanitarian crisis.”
At the end of this extraordinary meeting, the Chinese Foreign Ministry posted on its website at midnight a full-bodied statement by Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi titled China Stands on the Side of Peace and Human Conscience on the Question of Palestine. This initiative also prompted a call by the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan to Wang Yi.
In foreign affairs, evidently, not having contributed to promoting peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis, instead, the Abraham Accord has fuelled the conflict further. Indeed, at Naked Capitalism: Yves Smith notes the devastating geopolitical effects of the Gaza bombing on Biden's foreign policies where POTUS gets The Zelensky Treatment as Israel escalates, but then, Israel has a culture of deceit (Chris Hedges). The only way forward - according to Helena Cobban - will require a sober assessment of Hamas (Boston Review).
Wu Bingbing (吴冰冰), head of Peking University’s Institute of Arab-Islamic Culture would highlight on China’s policy towards the Middle East.
The essence of balanced diplomacy is not to choose sides, and secondly, not to make enemies. Although one may make friends with everyone, the timing will differ [虽然都交朋友,但有一个早晚].
WHY THE GREAT RECONCILIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST? (EXCERPTS)
Wu Bingbing (吴冰冰) – Director of the Institute of Arab & Islamic Culture, Peking University
Beijing Cultural Review – August 2023
“Factors external to the region, such as the restructuring of the US's Middle East strategy, the crisis in Ukraine and the repositioning of Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East, are together shaping the strategic landscape in the Middle East.”
“As one of the three main priorities of its global strategy (the 'Indo-Pacific', the Middle East and Europe), the United States can hardly abandon the Middle East altogether. The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan only means that the United States will not launch another large-scale on-the-ground war in the short term [in the region].”
“After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022, Russian diplomacy took on an ‘eastward-looking’ character, with the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East as the focus of its diplomatic layout [外交布局]. Moscow has deliberately stepped up its efforts to promote the construction of the International North-South Transport Corridor, a new corridor running from Russia to the Indian Ocean via Central Asia and the Caucasus, in order to counteract the sanctions and embargoes imposed by the United States and Europe on Russia. The importance of the Middle East in Moscow’s diplomatic layout has risen sharply, with Iran and Turkey, in particular, becoming a priority for Russian diplomacy.”
“China has long maintained close economic ties with the Middle East. In 2013, China put forward the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with countries in the region becoming important partners in building the BRI. With the deepening of economic ties, China's influence in the Middle East is shifting from a single economic dimension to include political, economic, security and cultural dimensions. In November 2019, China hosted the first Middle East Security Forum (MESF), and in 2022 the second one was held via video. Its aim is to build a platform for all parties in the Middle East to explore new ideas and plans for security governance. In this process, China has proposed a ‘New Security Architecture for the Middle East’ (NSAM). The NSAM reflects the idea that development and security issues should be integrated in a comprehensive manner. It focuses on the Gulf Security Dialogue Platform and the Palestinian issue, and strives to create the conditions for the mitigation and resolution of those hotspot security issues which are having the greatest impact on the Middle East's strategic landscape.”
“All in all, the influence and comparative power of the major powers in the Middle East are changing as a result of the adjustments in the policies and [strategic] layout of each country. However, no fundamental changes have yet occurred.”
2. Shifting our Focus from Sectarian Divisions to Geopolitics and Domestic Politics
“The Middle East's current strategic landscape continues to be characterised by three centres of power: [i] Iran and its alliance system, which includes Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen; [ii] Turkey, Qatar and the modernist Islamic Sunni movements that they support; and [iii] the alliance structure between Israel and the United Arab Emirates based on the Abraham Accords, which the United States has been pushing Saudi Arabia to join. The three centres of power that constitute the Middle East's strategic landscape determine the competitive geostrategic dynamics in the region. Most prominent here are the two central issues of Saudi Arabia and Iran's all-round strategic rivalry and the Palestinian issue.”
“A correct understanding of the Saudi-Iranian discord is a key to solving problems in the Middle East. After the signing of the Saudi-Iranian agreement in March 2023, which restored diplomatic relations between the two countries, many analyses by the press considered that China had resolved the millennium-old conflict between Islam’s two major sects. In fact, the sectarian differences between Shiites and Sunnis have always existed, but what has been interpreted as a fierce sectarian conflict is mainly a phenomenon that occurred after 2003. In order to isolate Iran conceptually, Jordan put forward the idea of the ‘Sunni triangle vs. the Shi’a crescent’ [逊尼派三角vs.什叶派新月], which distorts the geostrategic competition in the Middle East region into an inherent conflict between Sunni and Shi’a Islam, and between the Arab and Persian peoples. In this way, the conflict becomes unsolvable.”
“In reality, however, it is not only Shi’a organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq that have close ties with Iran, but also a significant proportion of Sunnis, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”]
“Unlike the narrative of sectarian confrontation, Iran's discourse is centred on ‘resistance’ against global and regional hegemony. At the start of the victorious Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Fathi Shaqaqi (1951-1995), the founder of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, argued that just as the people of Iran had been able to overthrow the US-backed Pahlavi regime, so too were the Palestinians capable of standing up against the US-backed Israeli occupation of Palestine. It is based on this understanding that Iran, Syria, Lebanon's Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are regarded as the ‘resistance camps’ [抵抗阵营] in the Middle East. This is based neither on [their] sectarian identity nor [their] ethnicity, but rather on political and strategic choices in the context of the global and regional strategic landscape.”
“According to Emirati scholar Mohammed Baharoon, the conditions for détente between countries in the region can only be created by transforming the concept of ‘grand competition’ into a strategy of ‘grand complementarity’. This requires taking a step-down from [our] understanding of conflict [in the region] and breaking out of [our] typical way of both thinking and talking about sectarian and ethnic conflicts [there]. [It also requires that we] turn [our] understanding of sectarian conflict back to geostrategic competition between states and to the political, economic and social tensions [矛盾] within each of these countries. This is an important cognitive change and a key step towards solving the [region’s] problems. At the operational level, the primary issue at hand is the establishment of a cross-Gulf dialogue platform to facilitate bilateral discussions on existing problems, particularly on urgent and central issues such as the problems in Yemen. This would be an important step towards regional détente. This is what China intends to achieve through its proposals to build a ‘new security architecture for the Middle East’ and to establish a ‘multilateral dialogue platform for the Gulf region’.”
3. The Middle East’s Turn Towards Asia
“In this [recent] round of reconciliation in the Middle East, what has attracted the most attention has been the role played by China. In our media, China is often depicted as having played a mysterious hand [神秘之手] and provided the ‘the first push’ [第一推动] in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. In reports by Western media, however, reference to China is as far as possible avoided and China’s influence strenuously brushed aside. So what role exactly has China played in [resolving] problems in the Middle East? It is worth noting that China did play a key role in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, but it did so by taking advantage [顺势而为] of favourable developments in the Middle East.”
“It was on the basis of its Asia-first diplomacy that Iran chose Beijing as the venue for its ultimate diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia.”
“In fact, Iran is not the only one turning to Asia. With the US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022, the Middle East has become increasingly interconnected with neighbouring regions, especially Asia. Qatar has become an important player in Afghanistan, Turkey is leading the Organisation of Turkic States as a platform to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, while more and more countries in the Middle East are applying to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). To date, Iran has already become an official member, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait are now dialogue partners. The Middle East is showing an overall turn towards Asia.”
4. The Marginalisation of the Palestinian Issue Despite Growing Tensions
“The Palestinian issue remains and is intensifying … In contrast to the peaceful trend prompted by the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement and the considerable attention it has attracted, the Palestinian issue seems to have been put to one side and ignored [似乎处于某种不闻不问不理状态]. At present, the international community’s mainstream view is that the Palestinian issue is now marginal, that most of the central issues in the Middle East are unrelated to it, and that even if the Palestinian problem were to be resolved, it would not help solve other issues [in the region]. In fact, however, the Palestinian issue remains at the heart of the Middle East’s geostrategic rivalries.”
“The so-called ‘marginalisation’ [‘被边缘化’] of the Palestinian issue has its roots in Israel. The objective of Israel's policy is to develop its ties with the Arab States in such a way that a growing number of them will remain detached or neutral with regard to the Palestinian issue. And while breaking out of its own isolation, [it hopes to] isolate Palestine.”
5. US Minilateralism: Widening Divisions and Exacerbating Tensions
“In September [2020], the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Israel signed the Abraham Accords at the US White House, thereby establishing formal diplomatic relations [between the two Arab States and Israel]. Three months later, Morocco followed suit. In 2021, the UAE, Israel, the US, and India set up the ‘Middle East Quad’, which was followed by an online summit in July 2022 and its official naming as I2U2. This type of cooperation mechanism, known as ‘minilateralism’, is an exclusive cooperative arrangement between a small number of countries around a specific issue. The Abraham Accords and the ‘Middle East Quad’ were born out of Trump's idea of a ‘Middle East Strategic Alliance’, whose goal was to promote the establishment of close security cooperation between the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and Israel in order to counter the influence of Iran and Turkey in the region. The idea was originally labelled ‘Arab NATO’.”
“As the Palestinians became increasingly isolated, Israel's willingness to resolve the Palestinian issue peacefully with a two-state solution declined. In November 2022, the rise of the far-right in Israel's general elections saw the 'Religious Zionist Party' become the third largest party in the Knesset and gain significant influence in the new government. The Abraham Accords have evidently not contributed to promoting peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Instead, it has fuelled the conflict further.”
“This situation has, in turn, exacerbated divisions among Palestinians. Since 2007, there has been a partition between the West Bank, controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and Gaza, controlled by Hamas. In the face of Israel's increasing refusal to compromise, the differences between political forces in the Gaza Strip, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian Authority widened. Palestinian political forces such as Hamas have stuck to their path of resistance, and in May 2021 an armed conflict between Gaza and Israel broke out. Based on these new political realities, Hamas began to restore its relations with Iran, Syria and other countries that had deteriorated as a result of the Arab Spring.”
”The signing of the Abraham Accords, the rise of far-right political forces in Israel, the increasing divisions within the Palestinian camp and the strengthening of the ‘resistance camp’ in the Middle East all demonstrate the centrality of the Palestinian issue to the [current] geostrategic rivalries in the Middle East. Although a negotiated political solution to the Palestinian problem on the basis of a two-state solution is the consensus among the international community, it lacks the drive to advance the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The US Trump administration’s proposed ‘deal of the century’ was in fact one-sided support for Israel [单边支持以色列]. The Biden administration has so far not put forward its own Middle East peace plan. Thus, in order to push for a political solution to the Palestinian issue, it is necessary to provide new impetus to the two-state solution and to the Middle East peace process.”
China’s Changing Policy Towards the Middle East
“On 13 June 2023, Palestinian President [Mahmoud] Abbas paid a state visit to China, the first by the head of state of an Arab country in 2023. During his visit, China put forward a three-point proposal [for the settlement of the] Palestinian question, the first of which [advocated] ‘the establishment of an independent State of Palestine that enjoys full sovereignty on the basis of the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital’—this is the essence of the two-state solution. The second [called for] the alleviation of the serious difficulties faced by Palestine’s economy and its people’s livelihoods; and the last [stressed the importance of] maintaining the peace talks.”
“At the same time, one must recognise that, in the face of the Israeli far-right’s aggressiveness [咄咄相逼], a growing number of young Palestinians have become disillusioned and even despondent about the peace process. In such an atmosphere, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is showing a tendency towards escalation [激化的态势]. Therefore, how to work towards managing and defusing the conflict is an important aspect of dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli problem. In order to manage and control the conflict, it is necessary to coordinate all aspects related to it, including Israel, the Palestinian Authority, but also political forces such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even countries and political forces in the region that have influence over the Palestinian issue, such as Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The promotion of peace and the management of this conflict are two interconnected aspects.”
“The development of China's foreign policy in the Middle East has been a process of constant repositioning [of its policy] towards the region. Initially, since developments in the Middle East were affecting China's periphery, including but not limited to Afghanistan, South Asia and Central Asia, China's positioning vis-à-vis the Middle East was [to view it as] an 'extension of its periphery' [周边的延伸]. By the beginning of the 21st century, this had evolved into [viewing the region as part of China’s] ‘greater periphery’ [大周边]. Today, countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran are gradually becoming a priority for our diplomacy. At the same time, China's knowledge about, and competence on, issues in Middle East are rising.”
“China's relations with Middle Eastern countries have risen to a new level with the continued deepening of economic cooperation and, in particular, with the gradual realisation of many BRI projects. The proposal of a new security architecture for the Middle East signifies a fundamental change in China's positioning towards the region. China has not yet proposed a security architecture for other regions [in the world]. [Thus,] this new security architecture underscores the Middle East’s special status [特殊地位] in China's diplomatic layout.”
“Iran's ‘Asia First’ foreign policy, the new development[-focused] philosophy of countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the enthusiasm of Middle Eastern countries for joining the SCO and the [increasing] importance they are giving to Asia [重视亚洲], have all created even better conditions for China to play a greater role in the Middle East. At the same time, the chain reactions and spillover of geostrategic rivalries among Middle Eastern countries, the rise of far-right political forces in Israel, and the 'minilateralism’ actively promoted by the United States are new challenges for China in the development of its relations with countries in region. Thus, China should steer the repositioning of its Middle East policy in a calm but active, prudent yet proactive manner, and focus on raising [its] level of awareness [about the region], as well as on improving capacity-building and expanding its policy toolbox.”
8. Chinese-style Modernisation: an Ideational Glue for China and the Middle East
“In September 2021 and April 2022, China put forward the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which focused on development and security, both of which are inseparable. The Middle East has long faced serious development- and security-related difficulties. The promotion of a new security architecture for the Middle East has become an integral part of putting the GSI and GDI into effect. This also means that the Middle East's security and development has gone from being a regional issue to a strategic priority [战略重点] in China's new globalised layout. However, there is no way that [China’s] new security architecture for the Middle East can include all the hotspot issues in the Middle East.”
“The concept of ‘Chinese-style modernisation' can play a unique role in promoting cooperation between China and the Middle East. China and many countries in the Middle East have begun to cooperate in jointly building the BRI. However, many Middle Eastern countries have understood Belt and Road cooperation simply as concrete projects. Moreover, Israel and others have not formally joined the BRI due to opposition from the US.”
“In the process of building a community with a shared future for mankind, China has proposed to join hands with the Arab world to build a China-Arab community with a shared future in the new era, which makes it all the more necessary to balance this with the development of relations with non-Arab countries in the Middle East such as Iran, Turkey and Israel.”
“Currently, [China’s] main focus is on the cross-Gulf security dialogue [platform] and the Palestinian issue. Against this backdrop, the concept of ‘Chinese-style modernisation’ can be said to be providing a shared framework of values for China and all countries in the region. All Middle Eastern states approve of and accept modernisation, and are pursuing this based on their specific national circumstances [国情] and with their own national characteristics. All countries in the region can draw lessons and inspiration from Chinese-style modernisation. This concept can [help] connect the joint building of both the BRI and a community with a shared future for mankind with the new security architecture for the Middle East, thus involving all countries in the region and providing more powerful support for the development of China's relations with these states.”