PREAMBLE
Moscow’s relations with Pyongyang have been warming since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine just over two years ago. Last September, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and spent almost a week in Russia’s Far East, aiming to deepen cooperation between the two sides. This was Kim’s longest foreign trip since taking power power in late 2011 and his first trip abroad in more than four years. In recent months, North Korea is reported to have shipped thousands of containers of munitions and missiles to Russia in support of its war in Ukraine. In return, Moscow is believed to be supplying North Korea with increasing amounts of oil that could contravene UN sanctions. In what appears to be a further sign that Putin may be planning a visit to Pyongyang in the near future, Russia’s foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, traveled to North Korea this week for talks on counterespionage and on “deepening Russian-North Korean cooperation in the face of attempts to increase pressure from external forces”.
So what might China make of this rapprochement? Officially, not much transpires. Beijing continues to emphasise its strong “friendship” with both Moscow and Pyongyang. However, if (and that is always a big if) the following views held by two researchers at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (a top Chinese think tank) were to be in any way indicative of those held by China’s leadership, Beijing may be feeling a certain unease about this deepening of ties between two of its closest partners.
BUILDING A 'COMPREHENSIVE' RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA: DRIVERS, SPILLOVER EFFECTS AND STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES (EXCERPTS)
Zhao Long (赵隆) – Deputy director, Institute for Global Governance Studies, SIIS
Lian Jiaxuan (廉佳璇) – MA student, SIIS
Academic Journal of Russian Studies (俄罗斯学刊), Dec. 2023, 13(06)
“The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea … and especially [their] discussions on Moscow potentially providing [Pyongyang] with sensitive technologies such as those relating to satellites, solid-fuel missiles and submarines, are bound to unsettle both regional players and other countries in the world. Strategic suspicion and mistrust among countries [are thus set to] rise.”
“In response, the United States may use this as a pretext to increase its military involvement in Northeast Asia. It may also deepen its coercive and institutionalised trilateral military-security cooperation – a ‘quasi trilateral alliance’ – with its Japanese and South Korean allies. This, in turn, will encourage Russia and North Korea to deepen their military-security ties, thereby contributing to the worsening of Northeast Asia’s security woes.”
“For Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), building a ‘comprehensive’ relationship and deepening strategic cooperation is a natural choice given their similar isolation, threat perceptions, strategic compatibility and complementary advantages. Their fundamental goal is to counter their exclusion, containment and encirclement by the West. However, such practices have indeed reignited negative Cold War memories among regional actors, deepened security concerns in countries such as Japan and South Korea, and compelled these states to integrate more deeply into the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance system through military cooperation, intelligence sharing, etc.”
“[These developments] are forcibly embedding the bilateral exchanges between China-Russia, China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea into the discursive logic of these three parties being interdependent [中俄朝三方联动的话语逻辑], [thereby] reproducing the antagonistic configuration of the ‘Northern Triangle’ (China, Soviet Union and North Korea) and the ‘Southern Triangle’ (United States, Japan and South Korea) [that existed] in Northeast Asia during the Cold War.”
“In future, if military-security cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang were to involve sensitive technologies, it might prompt Japan and South Korea to request [inclusion under] America’s protective nuclear umbrella, [thus] rendering the peninsula’s denuclearisation process void.”
“Even if Russia were to refrain from breaching relevant UN resolutions by helping North Korea improve its nuclear deterrent capabilities, close political, economic and security exchanges between Moscow and Pyongyang will lead to spiralling threat perceptions and distrust. This will severely restrict the effectiveness of efforts by major powers to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and negotiation.”
“Although both the construction of and the political communication surrounding the two countries’ 'comprehensive' relationship are accelerating, this strategic choice appears to be more akin to a stopgap measure based on short-term geopolitical interests where each side takes what it needs. [Their relationship] lacks substantial and non-substitutable mutual interests, and is even more bereft of institutionalised safeguards. Thus, the deepening of the ‘comprehensive’ relationship between Russia and North Korea still faces many uncertainties and structural weaknesses.”
“At present, Russia and North Korea do indeed have complementary diplomatic, security and economic needs. Such a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship can remain stable in the short term. However, the ups and downs in Russia-DPRK relations are usually inextricably linked to global and regional developments, with external factors as the dominant variables in their bilateral exchanges.”
“In future, Russia's desire and ability to get involved in Northeast Asian affairs will be limited if the development of the war in Ukraine and changes in the domestic affairs of those involved lead to a resumption of talks or even to a partial ceasefire. Whereas the DPRK needs to maintain national security, ensure regime stability and develop relations with its neighbours, Russia will not be content with being downgraded to a ‘regional power’ and will strive to take part in global agenda-setting and various international and regional affairs. This will require a comprehensive review of its resource allocation.”
“If Russia and North Korea’s ‘comprehensive’ relationship were to follow the logic of what the West calls ‘[political] alignment-for-aid and ammunition-for-technology’ [立场换援助、弹药换技术], the dynamic assessment of costs and actual benefits by both countries could lead to rifts if expectations are not met.”
“For instance, as early as 2014, North Korea was among the few countries to recognise the outcome of Crimea’s ‘referendum on joining Russia’, hoping to receive economic support from Russia in exchange for its political support. However, such expectations were ultimately dashed, with no signs indicating that North Korea had received any payback for its stance. Thus, while Moscow and Pyongyang have made firm political gestures towards building a ‘comprehensive’ relationship, its fragile mutually beneficial nature may undermine the resilience of their exchanges.”
“Overall, the Russia-DPRK ‘comprehensive’ relationship is built primarily on shared geopolitical and security interests. It is characterised by a focus on political security over economic development. In 2020, bilateral trade between Russia and North Korea amounted to just $42 million, with North Korea ranking a mere 139th among Russia's trading partners.”
“The economic structures of both countries are such that mutually beneficial cooperation can focus only on a limited number of issues … Thus, the sustainability and positive spillover effects of their ‘comprehensive’ relationship will be significantly limited by the fact that there are very few links between their respective interests.”
“As Russia-DPRK relations deepen, the West is attempting to portray China, Russia and North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’ and views the three countries as a new trilateral imperialist partnership. At the same time, while Russia rejects interpreting the Russia-DPRK ‘comprehensive’ relationship through a Cold War lens, it does not reject the framework of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and North Korea. During a visit to North Korea [last July], Russian Defence Minister [Sergei] Shoigu even proposed that the three countries hold joint naval military exercises.”
“It is undeniable that, in the face of growing hegemonism, unilateralism and power politics in the region, China, Russia and the DPRK do indeed share the basic view of opposing Cold War mentality, bloc confrontation and exclusive cliques targeting specific countries. However, a 'security alliance' [同盟安全] model guided by a binary opposition of 'enemy and self’ [敌我思维] is not in line with the 'Global Security Initiative' (GSI) advocated by China. In particular, such a model runs counter to the concept of joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.”
“Bilateral relations between China-Russia, China-DPRK and Russia-DPRK are developed on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. There is neither interdependence between them [相互间的联动性、依附性], nor do they involve confrontation and aggression towards third parties. Thus, if the goal is to achieve a 'triangular interconnection' [三角联动] between China, Russia and North Korea in Northeast Asia, and especially if the ‘comprehensive’ relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang is strategically orientated towards replicating the confrontational layout of the [Cold-War era’s] 'Northern and Southern Triangles' as a response to the 'quasi-alliance' between the US, Japan and South Korea, this will face many internal and external obstacles [将面临诸多的内外阻碍]. Furthermore, such a line of thinking would undoubtedly aggravate Northeast Asia’s security and governance problems.”