Between 1959 and the late ‘60s, a lot changed in America. And a lot of that change reverberated in election law—including how closely the Court scrutinized curbs on voting.
Recall from Class 5 that the standard utilized in the 1959 Lassiter case (upholding the North Carolina literacy test) was highly deferential to the state.
The Lassiter Court used a two-step process to reach its conclusion: 1) assessing that the state’s articulated goal—the “intelligent use of the ballot”—was a legitimate one; and 2) concluding that a literacy test—“the ability to read and write”—“has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.”
“[A] state might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the franchise…We cannot say…that it is not an allowable [standard] measured by constitutional standards.”
And under that highly deferential approach, the literacy test passed muster.
Over the next decade, the Court’s analysis of laws curbing voting would continue to use that same two-step process, still asking, 1) is the goal legitimate? and 2) does the means serve that goal? But over several cases, the Court would come to apply a far more rigorous standard in taking those two steps. And that more exacting scrutiny would make all the difference.
It would also mark the final nail in the coffin of the poll tax…
Poll Taxes: A Quick Review
Poll taxes were already on the wane in the nation—only four states still levied them—when the Court finally put them out of their misery in 1966. And the case that struck that final blow remains one of the most important in the history of voting rights.
But first, some background:
Poll taxes—cumulative in many states, required to be paid in advance in some states (trapping voters unaware of the prior deadlines when they were asked for receipts on Election Day)—took a huge toll on voters and shaped America’s democracy for generations. And recall that in 1937, in Breedlove v. Suttles, the Court upheld them as perfectly legitimate devices for states to use as a voter qualification. In many states, so-called “pauper laws” also were imposed—eliminating from the rolls voters who received public assistance.
Still, multiple sources of pressure eroded support for the poll tax in the first half of the 20th century. For one, poll taxes had the effect of disenfranchising poor White voters (agricultural and rural voters as well as working class voters) along with Black voters, eroding their acceptance in many places (of course that didn't sway those eager to suppress votes along class lines). Civil rights and voting advocacy groups intensely targeted them for years. The awkward optics of demanding taxes of active soldiers and veterans of foreign wars in order to vote, combined with a surge of poverty during the New Deal era, added further popular pressure to get rid of them (along with “pauper laws,” as the number of citizens on public assistance exploded).
These factors, combined with populist politics (think Huey Long in Louisiana) and partisan competition, began a steady state-by-state repeal of poll taxes (including North Carolina, Louisiana and Florida, all of which repealed them before WWII; and in the North, where no poll taxes remained by 1940). This ultimately culminated in the XXIV Amendment (ending the poll tax for federal elections in 1964). And in the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) Congress took the added step of finding that both federal and state poll taxes violated the Constitution. Tucked into the VRA, Congress also authorized the Attorney General to file suit to eliminate all remaining state-level poll taxes.
That test case would soon emerge as one of the most important decisions in election law jurisprudence…
Keep reading with a 7-day free trial
Subscribe to Pepperspectives to keep reading this post and get 7 days of free access to the full post archives.