How Japan lost the Battle of Midway, pt. 3
First Strike, American Attacks, Nagumo's Dilemma, and Other Complications
In part 1, we examined the background to Japan’s decision to bring battle to America at Midway, going all the way back to the Meiji Restoration.
In part 2, we examined the First Air Fleet with focus on its officers, the transit of Japanese forces to Midway, and the worrying intelligence they were getting.
In this part, we will discuss the opening hours of combat, Japanese naval aviation doctrine, and the problems Nagumo began to face.
Frenzy Before Dawn
When we last left Kido Butai, it was just entering position to strike Midway. Its mechanics and pilots had gone to bed early on June 3rd, knowing they would need to awaken early into the morning if the strike at 4:30 A.M. was to launch.
The pilots got a few extra hours, naturally, but the mechanics were up by 2:30 A.M., stumbling their way to the hangar. Across all four carriers, this was a force of about 1600 men, and they were arguably the best in the world for what they did.
Japanese carriers, unlike their American counterparts, did not store planes on the deck. Instead, they were kept inside an enclosed hangar, jam packed and held in place with wires. The artificial mix of “grease, oil, paint, and all the chemicals and lubricants” never went away despite the ventilation fans.
Large hoses were connected to planes and drop tanks (extra fuel containers that a pilot could remove in-flight) were attached to their appropriate aircraft. Inside the Soryu and Hiryu, men gathered the appropriate weapons from bomb storage rooms and set about moving them up. The process on Akagi and Kaga was a bit different, as dive-bombers were armed on the flight deck, not in the hangar.
The physical exertion needed was astounding. Each plane had to be moved individually up to the deck via an elevator, needing a dozen men to do so. The dive-bombers were particularly problematic as they had very little room to sit properly on the elevator itself. Add to this the heat that would build inside the hangar during the day and it was deeply uncomfortable.
Eventually all planes were up and ready to launch. Anyone looking around on the deck would have seen that the task force was now in a flight operations formation. The carriers had separated a bit, while their escorting ships created an outer perimeter.
Meanwhile, the planes were now ready to go, and the carriers steamed ahead at 24 knots. An important technical detail is that you needed a strong wind over the deck to give a plane sufficient lift. This could be accomplished by turning into a strong gust or simply accelerating to a higher speed.
The pilots rushed to their station, and began taking off one by one. This was a gleaming example of Japanese skill. In minutes, all 108 aircraft intended to strike Midway were in the air. By contrast, American carriers would have struggled to do the same in an hour. Nor could the sailors from the Land of the Free create combined-carrier strike forces as casually as their adversaries.
As a group, these planes then made their way towards their target. Nagumo could do nothing now, their success was out of his hands. All he could do was await the response.
But this did not mean that the carriers were standing idly by. They had to keep their Combat Air Patrol (CAP) up. These were the fighters that would circle above and pounce on any enemy air attack. In addition, the planes still aboard were being armed for the anti-ship strike that Yamamoto had insisted Nagumo keep ready. They could not be kept on the deck, however. Carriers of this era could only perform a single task at a time. For now, that meant decks were kept for refueling and rearming any landing CAP fighters.
Scouting the Seas
While all this was ongoing, some escorting vessels were preparing to aid the war effort in their own way by launching seaplanes to search the area to the force’s south and east (Midway’s west and north). This would be done in according to a plan devised by Genda.
As seen above, the plan called for seven lines to be searched with planes from five ships. One from the battleship Haruna, a pair each from cruisers Chikuma and Tone, and one each from Akagi and Kaga. Each plane, sans Haruna’s, was to fly for 300 nautical miles (345.2 miles, 555.6 km.) along their line before making a turn to port and flying along the perimeter of the search circle (the “dogleg” of the flight). After this, they would head back to their respective ship.
Now, 300 nmi might not sound like a big deal. But combined with the nearly semi-circular range, the search area was more than 176,000 square miles. For context, that is more area than Sweden. The weather was also not going to be uniform, meaning pilots wouldn’t see the same distance as each other.
In addition, scouts were supposed to stay low to the ground. This let them spot submarines, avoid attacks from below, and use the horizon to examine a ship’s profile to identify its type. But this came at the cost of limiting how far they could see.
This plan, it goes without saying, was fucking stupid. Seven planes to cover an area this size was pointless, a “rubber stamp than an honest attempt to assess if the enemy was truly at hand.” Genda and Nagumo should have understood that more planes were needed, and that was without considering the weather. Once again, we must ask why. Why did Genda not assign more planes to this task?
The first was the assumption that American carriers were not out at sea by this point, something that any prudent commander would have considered suspect at best from the intelligence reports detailed in part 2. The second was their offense-inclined mindset. Every plane sent for reconnaissance from the carriers was one that couldn’t be used for any future strike.
The planes went up as intended around 4:30 A.M., but one of them, Tone’s No. 4, was delayed by roughly 30 minutes.
Dots in the Sky
Nagumo had never doubted the need for a second strike to neutralize Midway. The initial wave had simply not contained enough firepower to do so. At 5:20 A.M., he sent out an order to the carriers to be ready to launch another wave.
But only 10 minutes later, cruiser Nagara and battleship Kirishima had laid down a smoke screen, indicating they had seen something. High above and 40 kilometers away, an American plane had been spotted.
Surprise was now clearly lost. At any moment, an enemy airstrike could arrive. Worse, his own strike wouldn’t be close enough to Midway as to prevent the launching of its planes.
Then, more bad news. Tone’s No. 4 scout plane reported that it had seen two submarines only 80 nmi from the force at 5:45 A.M. The CAP was thickened in response, and only 10 minutes later came a warning from the same plane. “‘15 enemy planes are heading towards you!’”
All You Need Have is Eyes and Hands
Technology is an important factor in warfare. Better range, better firepower, better communication and detection abilities, etc. are all important aspects that can swing battles. Even a slight edge can have tremendous value.
The key development at this moment in the battle was radar. More specifically, the Japanese lack of it. They were about two years behind the US in this regard. The first operational sets were being tested on ships bound for the Aleutians. Midway’s attackers were on their own.
This meant relying on many pairs of eyes trained to look upwards. This was not without its faults, of course. Eyes could see illusions, or brains could interpret things incorrectly. During the previous night, American planes had twice been “spotted” by the force’s jumpy lookouts. And of course, cloud cover thwarted detection.
There were some ways around this. Escorts stationed farther away deployed smoke to make their findings clear, while CAP pilots were trained to be vigilant.
Once a force was detected, however, what was one to do? There were, at this time, three methods of dealing with an enemy attack.
Direct the CAP towards the threat.
Deter or destroy the offenders with anti-aircraft (AA) fire.
Steer the vessel out of harm’s way.
Unfortunately, the Japanese had no good way of doing 1. The radios aboard CAP fighters were of poor quality and difficult to use. Moreover, all communication was done on a single frequency, which meant talking to relevant aircraft was impossible. This meant that for the most part, CAP fighters were going to react as they saw fit, which was hardly an ingredient in maintaining optimal air cover.
Japanese AA abilities were similarly lacking. For example, Akagi’s guns were older and weaker, placed in such a way that they couldn’t fire to both sides of the ship. Even if they could shoot, Japanese fire control, the science of directing bullets and shells, was unable to keep up with the violent maneuvers and speeds of then-modern combat. As seen below, Japanese AA became effective just after enemy dive bombers began their attacks.
This left option 3, which was steering the ship out of danger. Remember, bombers and torpedoes aren’t missiles. They couldn’t go so fast as to prevent a human response. Indeed, the Japanese preferred this approach, and their skippers were most definitely skilled enough to pull it off. They were helped by the lacking speed of American bombs and torpedos (Soryu and Hiryu could straight up outrun the “fish”).
But violent turns necessitated that escorting destroyers couldn’t remain close or else they risked being struck in the heat of battle. Formations were impossible to maintain. Likewise, this degraded the fire control measures even further, making shooting more difficult than ever.
Were these measures good enough? Eh…they were okay. Against a single attack, it would work just fine. Apply pressure from multiple angles and heights, however, and the defenses would be severely under strain.
I emphasized in previous posts that the Japanese were very confident going into this battle, and it shows in things like this. The fact of the matter was that the air defenses had never been tested thoroughly in all the months before. There was some concern when Kido Butai had been surprised by a British airstrike in the Indian Ocean during the month of April, but nothing was done.
Planes Above, Worries Afar
Even as he worried of enemies appearing above him, Nagumo had to think about the first strike he had sent. It was roughly 6:30 A.M. and they were set to be near the target by now, and indeed, Akagi received a message from the strike leader indicating he was beginning the attack with the sun to his back (a valid tactic even today as it blinds anyone looking for you). A few minutes later, the strike leader was heard ordering his planes to get back in formation and make the journey back. Lastly, he radioed the carriers that a second strike was needed.
7:10 A.M. arrived, and it brought with it the first American airstrikes. Two groups, one of small torpedo planes and the other of medium bombers, were coming in low.
The other low things were the aggressors’ skill and coordination. They appeared to be trying an anvil strike (attack from two different angle on the same target), except they picked two separate ships.
American lambs found themselves braving a Japanese wolves nest. The bombers had enough armor and defensive armament that they were much harder to put down, with one even taking down an approaching Japanese fighter. The smaller planes had none of that.
US pilots were being picked apart even as they started their final attack runs. The small planes launched their torpedos, but it was obvious they were doing it too soon, giving the carriers ample time to react. The bombers likewise dropped torpedoes, but they went nowhere.
The sky was clear of American aircraft as the survivors rushed home - save for one. Incredibly, one of the bombers had been fatally damaged by Akagi’s guns. Whether it was unmaneuverable, or the pilot had resigned himself to death, we do not know. What we do know is that he set his plane on down on a collision course with Akagi’s bridge. There was no hope of dodging it now.
But fate spared Nagumo at this time, for at the last moment, the plane cartwheeled and exploded upon contact with the ocean, not the carrier. A mere 10 feet lower and the commander of Kido Butai would be dead.
This was the last straw. The strike leader’s message, the recent strafing and torpedo attacks, and finally a time-traveling American kamikaze had set his blood aflame. Midway had to be destroyed ASAP. Thus, he ordered the reserve strike to be armed for a second attack on Midway against Yamamoto’s orders.
No Easy Feat
A common mistake that historians have made, the authors argue, is in using American carrier doctrine when talking about the Japanese. This is not only a bad practice when doing history in general, but it completely misinforms about Japanese capabilities and preferences.
The first thing to understand is that Japanese carrier doctrine favored balanced strikes to gain the benefits of combined arms. This had the benefit of splitting an enemy’s focus in different directions. The second thing is to remind yourself that the Japanese were far less likely to break with doctrine. To break with doctrine is to violate orders and required a thinking mind and independent will, exactly what the Japanese did not cultivate.
Why this matters is that it greatly informs what kinds of orders were going to be given. For example, Nagumo could have ordered Soryu and Hiryu to send only their dive bombers against Midway, which would be faster than a balanced strike. But Nagumo was not a man to break with culture, not over this, and so this possibility may have been considered but would just be discarded.
This doesn’t mean that there weren’t tactical reasons behind the decision to re-arm for a full and balanced second strike. There was no reason to think sending the second wave would be harder than the first. The first strike would also undoubtedly have taken losses, meaning it would be weaker if sent out again in the afternoon. Nor was Midway going anywhere.
An equally important question is how long it took the Japanese between ordering a strike and seeing it launched. Remember, this was done by hand and needed much labor. It would take about 1.5 hours to re-arm all the level bombers, then another 45 minutes to spot and warm up the planes on the deck. Dive bombers would be armed on the deck, so a few extra minutes would go to that.
All in all, about 2.5 hours to launch a strike at this point.
The process labored on, while the scout planes were almost all back from their patrols. Nagumo would recompose himself. He had nothing to worry about now. In a few hours, Midway would burn and America would-
“Sight what appears to be 10 enemy surface units, in position bearing 10 degrees distance 240 miles from Midway. Course 150 degrees, speed over 20 knots.”
Nagumo’s Dilemma
The best way to describe Nagumo would undoubtedly be “stunned”. But he and his staff would quickly have begun reacting to the message from Tone’s No. 4.
The first question was whether the report was even true, and there were clear reasons for doubting it. Tone’s No. 4 didn’t have a path anywhere near that point by this stage of his planned flight. Chikuma’s No. 1, the plane which did have such a path, reported nothing. Moreover, scout planes sometimes took liberties with their reported contacts, and Nagumo was well aware of this.
Assuming it was true, the second question was whether to strike or not. To act now was understandable.
The presence of any American force in this location was highly suspicious. Why was it there?
The force was presumably aware of Kido Butai’s location since Midway knew.
The force was steaming into the wind, which was necessary for launching carrier-based planes.
But leaving this supposed contact alone was also intuitive.
The pilot could have been wrong or trying to lie about some crucial details like distance or direction.
“10 surface units” was too vague. Were they cruisers? Destroyers? Was a carrier present?
There was no method of striking in accordance with doctrine.
Even if a strike was ordered, it would be cutting it close with also landing the planes returning from Midway.
It is worth stating that 2 would have been very fresh in Japanese minds. At the Battle of Coral Sea a month ago, a major strike had been launched as soon as an American force was detected, only for it to be two ships of little importance.
Given all this, should Nagumo have ordered a strike? The answer to this question will come in a later installment in this series, but his actual decision was to not act immediately on this information. This decision, as seen above, was defensible and doctrinally sound.
But there were undoubtedly other reasons for his decision, bad ones. For one thing, he likely felt no real urgency despite a worrying new possible threat. He also showed his belief in American weakness, announcing that he intended to beat them in a “daylight engagement.”
What was the problem with that? The problem was that “daylight engagement” really meant a surface action, meaning the use of naval guns. Nagumo judged this force so weak as to think it could be dealt with via the destroyers, cruisers, and two battleships at his side. A wise commander would not underestimate the possible threat.
No Good Men News
Naturally, Nagumo ordered Tone’s No. 4 to “advise ship types”. This message went out at 7:58 A.M. About 10 minutes later, the pilot radioed back and declared there to be five cruisers and five destroyers.
A wave of relief washed over the Japanese, but Kusaka recalled being suspicious. It was, after all, only one message. He was proven right when the pilot reported again after another 10 minutes. “The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier.”
This was horrendous news. There was no way of denying it, the original battle plan was rotting in the garbage. The US Navy was out in force in the area. That flattop was now the highest priority.
But there was no time for only contemplation. More dots were appearing on the horizon.
Attack, Attack, Attack
Between the first message from Tone’s No. 4 and the landing of the first strike, no less than four attacks forced the Japanese ships to pivot and dodge their way around bombs and torpedoes.
At 7:53 A.M. came 16 dive bombers. These pilots were very inexperienced, some having only flown their planes for the first time a few days ago. Their commander decided to execute a shallow glide-bombing, but it didn’t matter. The CAP swarmed over them and sent flaming bodies into the ocean. No hits were scored.
Almost simultaneously, 12 B-17 bombers appeared high in the sky. At 20,000 ft. (6,096 m.), the CAP was going to have a tough time even coming close. But this also gave the targets below ample time to avoid the payloads. Coolly, Japanese captains watched as the bombs were released, then executed their turns.
There are a few WW2 images you would have seen in your history textbooks if they covered Midway, possibly including the one below. Depicted is the Soryu as it turns starboard to dodge the B-17 attacks.
Then, at 8:24 A.M., a sharp-eyed CAP fighter noticed something. A periscope! He quickly strafed the intruder. Japanese sonar had its location as well, and some escorts homed in to attack.
This submarine was a dogged pursuer, staying close and firing even as it had to dive several times to avoid being blown away by depth charges and bombs. The carriers, however, were able to break away.
The third attack came several minutes after the submarine had been spotted and once more consisted of dive bombers. The closest carriers turned away, and the attack’s commander decided to instead go after the battleship Haruna. This too was a failure, its experienced captain taking the ship through an elegant dance between the bombs.
Scattered Happenings
The first strike had made contact with the fleet during the initial attacks. Unable to land while maneuvers were being executed, they circled and waited until the all-clear was given. At 8:37 A.M., Akagi began taking its children on.
Meanwhile, Nagumo and his staff were clear on what to do next. Having committed to destroying the enemy carrier, he ordered the planes to be armed with armor-piercing bombs.
At 8:45 A.M., Tone’s No. 4 sent a report that he had spotted two more cruisers. Nagumo informed Yamamoto 10 minutes later, but the latter was actually entirely aware. In a bizarre twist, he was utterly unfazed by this development and did nothing. Perhaps he thought Nagumo had the reserve strike ready to go.
The submarine was still around and firing whenever it could, though no hits had been scored so far. The destroyer Arashi, by order or its own initiative, began a determined hunt to keep this attacker down while Kido Butai got away.
What Happened on Midway?
By 9:10 A.M., the strike had been recovered, and it was time to debrief its members.
The initial approach had gone well, with improving weather as they headed south. They had, of course, been unaware that the Americans had detected Kido Butai shortly after the launch. No, they only knew the US pilots were up in the air when ambushed as they approached Midway.
But the initial blow’s success dissipated as the accompanying fighters tore through their US counterparts. Any attempts at dogfighting were smothered as the Japanese pilots and planes were in all relevant aspects just better.
Now unhindered by the American CAP, the bombers made their runs. There was no hope of getting away unscathed, however, as a literal storm rose in defense. Flak and bullets burst and tore their way through the Japanese planes, several down going down in fireballs. Hiryu’s report on the matter said that these guns were using excellent directors, having highly accurate and intense power. This was a virtue recognized of the US, even at Pearl Harbor - if it were actively fighting, the number of bullets headed your way would be enough to construct a literal wall.
How much damage had been inflicted? They couldn’t be sure. The pilots of each ship claimed a wide variety of results. Some were modest, others were clearly fantastical. Parshall and Tully explain that the officers were most likely aware that although enemy fighter power had been mauled, Midway’s AA-guns still had to be silenced. Worse, this meant that until they were, no support to the invasion force could be given.
The losses were heavy, with each ship having lost several planes from its air group. When counting all planes no longer available for duty, an astounding 23% of the force was gone. If this was the strength of American anti-aircraft guns, the carriers would run out of planes after only a few more strikes.
Next time: Kido Butai’s luck runs out.
Image Sources
Genda search map - taken from Shattered Sword, pg. 111
This is Where the Fun Begins meme - http://i1.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/original/001/225/537/ee2.jpg
Japanese effective AA range diagram - taken from Shattered Sword, pg. 141
Soryu dodging - https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Tj-nt8iRg1U/XVwto6yS6fI/AAAAAAAARd8/2z-CrFcMY28igu34X3wb0PgrnGDWTMDsACLcBGAs/s1600/Battle_of_Midway%2B%252816%2529.jpg
"The bombers had enough armor and defensive armament that they were much harder to put down, evening taking a Japanese plane down."
I'm not sure this sentence was written as intended.