What can the West learn about Great Power Competition from the Global War on Terror?
NB This is a more in detail look at a previous piece that was published here on the Global War on Terror in an Era of Great Power Competition. The below piece has been written for my Contemporary Conflicts Module this year.
The combination of the fall of Afghanistan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as heated tensions in the Pacific around Taiwan have led to a narrative building that we are entering an era of great power competition and the years of the global war on terror are over. For those that have been paying attention however, the writing has been on the wall for a while that this would occur. Great powers have been competing long before Ukraine and some leaders such as Boris Johnson had naively thought that this was not the case proclaiming that the age of tank battles in Europe were over. However, in the Wests haste to prepare for great power competition it is important to not make the same naïve judgements over how great power competition will be fought.
It is important to highlight the difference between great power competition and great power conflict. If one is to look at the Cold War as an example competition is likely to occur covertly or in proxy wars. Preparing for the worst such as a Soviet invasion of the Fulda Gap was necessary and so will preparing to fight Russia at the Suwałki Gap or challenge China navally for control of the First and Second Island Chains but if the nuclear taboo is to hold it is likely that these conflicts will not come to pass. As such the more likely cases of great power competition will happen in the developing world. It is key to note that the threat from terrorist groups in the Middle East and Africa has not gone away and as such remote warfare operations provide a conduit for great powers to challenge each other. As such this paper seeks to look at the competition that has already occurred throughout the global war on terror in areas such as Syria, the Sahel, Afghanistan, and how prepared the West is to deal with this challenge.
To understand why great power competition has happened during the Global War on Terror it is vital to understand other actor’s views on this era. Russia did not always have a negative view of the global war on terror. In the wake of the attacks on September 11th, 2001, Vladimir Putin would be the first world leader to give condolences to President Bush and Russia and NATO would give a joint statement calling the attack “barbaric”. This was done as Putin saw that the US and Russia’s interests aligned in the wake of 9/11 as Putin was embroiled in his own war in Chechnya against Islamic extremism. He feared that terrorist training camps in Northern Afghanistan were being used to train fighters from the Caucasus and as such he would support the US invasion despite some dissent in the Kremlin about NATO operating in Central Asia.
Russia would not be the only historic enemy of the West that would share interests with the US in the wake of 9/11. Iran would also support the US effort with an “unwritten pact” forming between the US and Iran. Qasem Soleimani and Mohammad Javad Zarif would play an instrumental role in building ties between the US and the Northern Alliance to lay the groundwork for the invasion of Afghanistan. These alliances would however be short lived. George W Bushes “Axis of Evil” speech in 2002 would torpedo the ties that had been cultivated between the State Department and Iran. This would lead to Iran preparing “secret cells” in Iraq where IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah trainers would enter Iraq to train Iraqi Shia militias such as the Badar Brigades.
Russia would take longer than Iran to act in opposition to the Wests counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East. The first event that would change Russia’s turn toward the West would be the so called “Colour Revolutions.” Several revolutions would happen across Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East that include the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2012, the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine in 2004, and the "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. The Kremlin has interpreted these as being instigated by the West to spread its influence using democracy promotion and NGOs in what Russia considers its “near abroad”. Russia would also criticise the US invasion of Iraq. Putin would concede in October of 2003 that the Saddam regime was a criminal regime but would compare the intervention to the Soviet-Afghan war and criticised the invasion for creating a hotbed for extremists. The last and most pivotal change would come in 2011 with the NATO intervention in Libya. Putin would become annoyed with the Obama administration as Obama would promise in 2008 that the US would no longer rampage around the world conducting regime change wars. Putin would see the overthrow of Gaddafi as a turning back on this policy and he would say to Obama that he would be vindicated on his scepticism of US foreign policy. As such this would instantiate a frosty relationship between Russia and the US that has not recovered since.
Syria would finally see this degradation in relations coming to a head. The Arab Spring of 2011 would see large scale revolts in Syria against the Assad regime. A relatively unknown member of Al Qaeda in Iraq Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi would take this as an opportunity to declare a caliphate under the new name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. By Summer 2014 ISIS had torn through much of Syria laying waste to government forces and other opposition groups. By August the US had declared the start of Operation Inherent Resolve to drive back the group. Early in 2015 the battle of Kobani would go to show that Kurdish forces backed with US airpower could hold their own. As such it would become clear to Russia that if it did not intervene another autocratic regime may be toppled in a “colour revolution.” As such Russia would covertly deploy forces to an airbase in Khameimim in Latakia Province. By September they would begin to conduct airstrikes. Despite claiming that they were fighting the Islamic State most of these airstrikes were conducted against US and Turkish backed groups. It is clear that pushing back US influence was a vital goal for Russia. As the war would continue there would be multiple episodes in which Russia would directly and indirectly challenge coalition forces. The skies would become an area that the Russian VKS would use to challenge US aircraft. During the battle of Raqqa Russian aircraft would fly in proximity with US forces as they supported Syrian forces on the opposite bank of the Euphrates. This led to many close encounters such as in September 2017 a Russian SU-35 would target coalition forces and drop bombs near their position. This would lead to a mixture of SU-30s, SU-34s and SU-35s getting into mock dogfights with US F-15Es and F-22s. This was done by “spiking” each other which involves aircraft locking onto each other but not firing their weapons.
On the ground similar developments were occurring. Contestation would happen between both Russian regular and irregular forces. In August 2020 both US and Russian forces were patrolling near the Turkish and Iraqi borders of Syria. When the convoys met each other Russian Tigrs would begin to ram US MRAPs causing the convoy to have to turn around and many of the occupants being diagnosed with concussions. 2018 would however see the largest clash between US and Russian forces. On February the 7th a large firefight would kick off between members of Russia’s Wagner Group and US Special Forces. A mixture of thirty Delta and Rangers were stationed outside the city of Deir al-Zour protecting a Conoco gas plant. A mixture of Wagner Group and Syrian forces at about five hundred strong would attack the position of the Special Forces. The attack would be repelled by a combination of strikes from Reaper drones, F-22 stealth fighter jets, F-15E Strike Fighters, B-52 bombers, AC-130 gunships, AH-64 Apache helicopters, HIMARs strikes, and a QRF of Green Berets and Marines from a base twenty miles away. This would lead to between two hundred and three hundred pro-Syrian forces dead and no casualties on the US side.
The Wagner Group has not only been used in Syria but has become a tool that Russia has operated around the world to challenge the West. Russia would use the group to challenge the French led counter terror operations in Mali known as “Operation Barkhane.” This operation would come to an end in early 2022 and Wagner would play a large role in the French failure in the region. In May 2021 a military junta would come to power in Mali. This new government would seek to move further away from France and would invite Wagner into the country. This was done to provide the same remote warfare capabilities that French special forces were conducting with the Malian Army. France in response would eventually cut its ties with Mali and withdraw. This would happen just before Russia invaded Ukraine and as such it leaves the security of Mali in dire jeopardy. Russia does not have as much of a security interest in the Sahel as it does in Syria. Russian counterterrorism mostly focuses on the internal threat to the South Caucuses, especially Chechnya. Large amounts of Chechens went to fight for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria making its intervention a way of managing a domestic security risk as well as being a way to challenge Western interests. The Sahel poses a direct security risk to Europe as it is the gateway between jihadists in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Without disruption in the region this poses a threat to the security of the Mediterranean. Russia has none of these interests and there are no Chechen foreign fighters in the region making this an explicit challenge to Western interests more than it is a legitimate counterterrorism interest.
Russia has supported terrorist groups to challenge Western interests making its counter terrorist goals seem very hollow. In the final few years of the war in Afghanistan both Russia and Iran would back the Taliban. This would be done covertly as Russia would believe that the Afghan government was an extension of the US. As such it would provide the Taliban with night vision, body armour, and armour piercing ammunition. The Taliban would want a larger commitment such as surface to air missiles, but Russia refused as they wanted support to be something that would humiliate NATO, but it considered the provision of these weapons as too overt. Iran has made similar calculations to Russia and is operating with a similar strategy that the US used during the Cold War in which the enemy of your enemy is your friend. Many high-profile leaders of the Taliban have spent time in Iran at the invitation of the IRGC. The IRGC has gone as far as to arm and lead Taliban forces in an attack against the city of Farah in 2018 which led to the city almost being taken. This support would continue right through to the fall of Kabul.
Since this point however, the ties between the Taliban and Russia and Iran are becoming frayed. Despite the fact the Iran had strong ties with parts of the Taliban in the west of the country it has a does not have a favourable view of the Haqqani Network. This is due to the Haqqani Networks propensity to attack Shia groups in Afghanistan. Since the take over there have been border clashes that have happened between the Taliban and Iranian border guards. Russia had built strong ties with former Afghan president Hamid Karzai and had hoped that the new Taliban government would be able to represent a multitude of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups. This however would not be the case and Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has voiced his concerns over this. Both Russia and Iran have alienated their support with their traditional allies in Afghanistan such as the Hazaras as they were instrumental in getting these groups to stand aside so the Taliban could take over and now these groups are seeing the results of that. None the less both actors got what they wanted by humiliating the US and NATO.
Russia’s re-entry into the Middle East in 2015 has made Russia and Iran operate closer together in recent years. One of the key figures that played a role in convincing Putin to intervene in Syria was Qasem Soleimani. In July 2015 he would visit the Kremlin and meet with Putin. Many of Putin’s inner circle were deeply impressed by Soleimani and one analyst would state that it was clear that Putin would not have intervened in the same way he did without the input of Soleimani. This would lead on to Russia and Iran working closely together as the two main backers of the Assad regime. Iran would begin to move in fighters from its many proxy organizations such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Liwa Fatemiyoun, and Liwa Zainebiyoun. These would at first start off as trainers like the secret cells in Iraq in 2003. However, the more dire the situation became Iran would see its proxies fighting alongside forces of the Syrian government. They would also receive training from the Russian army in traditional manoeuvre warfare tactics that they could bring to bear in the field. Military command in Syria would mostly be conducted by Russian officers but a combination of liaisons from the IRGC, Hezbollah, and Syrian intelligence would be stationed together at Russia’s airbase in Khameimim to provide joint command and control. Tension would boil between Russia and Iran however, when it came down to what to do about rebuilding the capabilities of the Syrian army. Russia wanted to create a professional fighting force whereas Iran wanted to create militias. This would lead to tension and accusations by Iran that Russia was not providing adequate aircover to Iranian backed groups and that they were acting callously about the numbers of Iranians that had been killed during the siege of Khan Touman. Despite these issues their relationship has continued to deepen. The groundwork that was put in place in Syria is now coming to a head in Ukraine. Iran has been providing drones to help Russia’s strategic bombing campaign in Ukraine. Along with this the IRGC has put boots on the ground in Crimea to help train and operate these drones. Despite the fact that Iran is not what we would think of when we think about great powers it has influence across multiple continents. Its ties in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and now to be the first Middle Eastern military to have boots on the ground in Europe since the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. It clearly is beginning to act like a second-rate power that is ready to project its influence like Cuba during the Cold War.
Given the above scenario how should the West react to this type of challenge. NATO’s Madrid Conference in July would see NATO come forward with a new strategic concept paper. This outlines the main challenges to the organization going forward. The paper mentions the need to prepare for challenges from Russia claiming that it is the biggest threat to the alliance. Terrorism is also mentioned as the largest asymmetrical threat to its states. Hybrid threats to Eastern Europe are mentioned as well as the need for a security interest in the MENA region. However, the paper has not made the connection between these pieces. Fighting terrorism is now simultaneously a game of great power competition. The link is made to hybrid threats, but it is not extended to NATO’s counterterrorism roles. Already active warzones make targeting Western troops much easier and as previously stated terrorist forces are being backed by state actors as they also pose a threat to the West. In 2021 there would be a rare admission by Brigadier Mark Totten of Britain’s Royal Marine Commandos that UK Special Forces have a role in specifically countering Russia and China. As such it is clear that this is being thought of in some shape or form within militaries especially as remote warfare has become the West’s new way of fighting conflicts. However, it does not seem that this has permeated its way into the discussions of policy makers and politicians. The need to increase military budgets to both deal with the event of great power conflict and as a deterrent in great power competition is likely to overshadow these concerns.
It is clear with the above evidence that Russia has been challenging the West for many years and Western counter terrorism operations have become one of its conduits to do so. From Syria to the Sahel to Afghanistan Russia was involved for the explicit purpose of challenging Western interests. Russia and Iran through being marginalized on the world stage and having similar goals have started to become closer allies. The ties that have been forged in Syria are now being used outside of the Middle East to challenge the West in Ukraine. These ties are only likely to deepen in the future. The West needs to clearly understand the threat that this poses to its interests because this is likely the beginning not the end of this form of geopolitical challenging. If the West has overseas deployments Russia and Iran will find a way to challenge them and understanding there is a place for remote warfare operations to explicitly rebuff this challenge is vital.