This piece is a follow up to the article where I broke down the non-military state and non-state actors. This article is to break down the common Russian military and intelligence units that are discussed in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. There are many different units operating in country with their own training and doctrine and even in some cases their own interests. As such an understanding is needed of the interplay between these forces and who they are in order to understand what is being seen on the ground in Ukraine.
Motorized Infantry
Russia’s military is mostly made up of motorized infantry. In the West motorized infantry usually refers to infantry that are moved around the battlefield in trucks and then dismount in order to fight. Mechanized infantry on the other hand are infantry that are attached to infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). In Russian doctrine however motorized rifle brigades actually refer to what we would call mechanized infantry in the West. Often confused with tanks by the general public IFVs such as the Russian BTR (seen above) or BMP are designed to move infantry into place as a truck would but gives them added armoured protection from enemy fire. When the infantry dismount the IFV remains on the battlefield to provide support to the infantry. IFVs are distinguished from tanks in two ways, the first of these is the ability to carry infantry and the second is that they are armed with lighter weapons.
Russia has decided to prioritize these types of troops due to its geography. Russia’s largest strategic concern is a land war from Europe across the North European Plain. As such it has chosen to prioritize infantry that can move quickly alongside tank formations for a land war. The West on the other hand has more of an emphasis on light infantry that move around on foot. On paper the added protection, firepower and speed of the Russian model seems like the better option but the logistics of moving light infantry by air or by sea is much easier than trying to ship IFVs across the world. As such Western forces can deploy a higher concentration of troops faster to anywhere in the world.
Significant problems have been seen in Russia’s mechanized infantry in Ukraine. As previously stated, Russian doctrine revolves around a potential land war with the West in Europe. As such Russia has prioritized technical roles such as drivers and gunners within their IFVs that are harder to train than the infantry that ride in the vehicles. The idea of this being that when conscription is brought in it is easier to train the infantry dismounts to an intermediate level of how to shoot a rifle or a machine gun and some training in small unit tactics. The harder to train for roles are already in place to accommodate the influx of conscripts. However, because Russia is fighting a “special military operation” in Ukraine this mobilization has not occurred. This means that Russia is severely lacking in infantry. For example, both the BMP and BTR can carry eight passengers however reports have been coming out of Ukraine that they are carrying as little as two or three soldiers in the back. Modern combined arms warfare needs interplay between different assets such as tanks, infantry, and aircraft. Infantry is needed to protect tanks from enemy infantry that are armed with anti-tank weapons and then the tanks provide fire support to the infantry as well as protection from other tanks. Infantry are also vital for holding territory as well as interacting with and policing civilians. The lack of this ability has been a large issue for Russian forces in the region and is a large reason why tank losses have been so high as well as lack of protection for logistics convoys. Western ATGMs are getting a lot of the credit for these kills but a lot of older unguided anti-tank weapons such as the Soviet RPG-7 are also doing a lot of the work which can be seen below. With proper protection from infantry this should not be happening especially in open field combat.
Battalion Tactical Groups
One of the main buzzwords that has been talked about during the war in Ukraine is Russian battalion tactical groups. As has been already mentioned when it comes to Russian doctrine it mostly relies on ground forces and conscription in times of total war. As such Russia has created battalion tactical groups. The idea of these is to give a brigade two manoeuvre elements known as BTGs. Then a third BTG will be created from the rest of the brigade when conscripts can be brought in to staff the rest. Below is an example of how they are set up.
They are designed to rapidly take and control territory. However, this harsh offensive capability can come at the expense of logistic capabilities. In recent conflicts these units have been the centre of Russia’s manoeuvre elements and have been the spear of its assaults. There were many uses of these forces in the war in the Donbass including the first battle of Mariupol and the Siege of Donetsk Airport. The US has been studying the effects of BTGs in these battles where they were resoundingly successful against Ukrainian forces and an academic paper was published on their use by the US Army at Fort Benning called “Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group”. As such the lessons that have been learned by this paper were filtered down into training regiments by US Special Forces and the CIA Ground Branch that have been training forces in Ukraine. As such Ukraine has been much more effective at dealing with the challenges of Russian BTGs this time.
Military Police
Russia’s military police were set up in 2012 by Russian defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov and was heavily supported by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This was originally designed to combat the culture of “Dedovshchina” in the Russian military. This is a brutal form of hazing that exists outside of the official training on conscripts and recruits within the Russian military. This has led to many deaths over the years and this breeding of uncontrolled violence within Russia’s ranks has been seen as one of the reasons for Russia’s brutal war crimes in Chechnya and Bucha. From a self-interested perspective even if Russian command does not care about these war crimes it is in their interest to make sure their troops are not being killed in training.
The military police have expanded its role since being set up and has been vital in Russia’s operations in Syria and Ukraine. At their founding they were not supposed to operate outside the border of the Russian Federation, but this swiftly changed with the Syrian operation. The Military Police have been used to help carry out law enforcement duties and to control territory that has already been occupied. There they carried out operations such as manning checkpoints, protecting Russian military assets, helping the Syrian government with law enforcement actions such as crime prevention, brokered and enforced ceasefires and helped resettle refugees. This was done alongside the Kadyrovtsy who were used to bridge the gap between Russian forces and the Syrian Muslim population using the Chechen’s Islamic faith.
In Ukraine the Military Police is carrying out similar actions but they have been also operating alongside the Rosguard and the FSB to quell Ukrainian resistance behind the lines of the occupation. For example, in Kherson the Military Police rounded up 400 activists who were protesting against the Russian occupation. Crowds were dispersed using live ammunition that was fired into the air. As in Syria they are protecting military assets and working on counter-insurgency operations where they have made arrests of Ukrainians found with weapons who are trying to fight against the occupation from behind the front lines.
VDV
The VDV is one of the most famous units of the Russian military. VDV stands for Vozdushno-desantnye voyska Rossii which in English translates to Russian Airborne Forces. These are Russia’s parachute infantry similar to that of the US 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions or the UK’s parachute regiment. These units are designed to drop ahead of advancing units to secure important targets for an advance such as bridges. However, airborne forces have always been seen as more elite expeditionary troops straddling the line between regular infantry and special forces. From Nazi Germany’s Fallschirmjäger who were some of the most revered units of the Second World War to the 82nd Airborne being deployed by the US to Kabul airport last August to help secure it for evacuation, Airborne troops have an elite notoriety that surrounds them.
Russia’s VDV has its roots in the Soviet Airborne Forces which were set up during the Second World War. The Soviet Navy was not used as much during this period as the battle on the Eastern front was primarily a land battle. As such many members of the navy were taken off ships and sent to fight on land with the Soviet army. They would continue to wear their traditional white and navy striped undershirts that was a naval tradition that started in the French Navy in the 1800s. These shirts in Russian are known as Telnyashkas. These shirts began to be adopted by Russian units who had fought with the navy after the war as their own symbols of pride. A sky blue and white shirt would be worn unofficially by many members of the VDV after the war however in 1970 it would be adopted officially into the uniform with a sky-blue beret as seen below.
This is the most recognizable feature of the unit with them being widely seen in the Soviet-Afghan war. This has also trickled down into pop-culture and is often seen worn by Russian soldiers in TV, movies, and video games with a few prominent examples in the 2019 game Modern Warfare as well as 2011s Battlefield 3. In Ukraine they have also started wearing the ribbon of St George which is a Russian patriotic symbol that is commonly used in remembrance of the Second World War and is often seen at the victory day parades on May the 9th in Moscow. The VDV has been wearing the orange and black ribbon in their helmets as can be seen above.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the VDV has been used in heavy combat in Chechnya but has also been seen used as an expeditionary force that can be moved into a country rapidly if needed. As such they have been used in various policing actions as was seen in January’s deployment of the CSTO to Kazakhstan.
However, Ukraine is the first time that they have been able to carry out the traditional role that they have trained for. On day one of the conflict the VDV were airlifted into Hostomel (also known as Antonov) Airport outside of Kyiv by MI-8 helicopters as is seen below.
This airport was a hub for non-commercial aircraft and as such takes massive amounts of cargo in and out of Ukraine every day. In line with the VDV’s mission of securing vital infrastructure the control of this airport in working order would allow Russia to create an air bridge and fly in sustainment equipment such as food and ammunition as well as troops into Ukraine. This goal was however over ambitious. Airborne troops because they must be carried by air and sustain themselves on the ground without support cannot carry the heavy equipment that other units such as motorized infantry can. As such these forces are a stopgap measure to fight and protect an area until they can be relieved by heavier assets. The forces at Hostomel were never relieved and as such after a few hours they were wiped out by the Ukrainian National Guard’s 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade with assistance from the Ukrainian air force. The airport was eventually taken by Russian forces about a week later including a detachment of the Kadyrovtsy. The runway however had been sabotaged by the Ukrainians rendering the airport unusable.
There have been other attempts at using the VDV in their intended role in Ukraine however these have also been equally disastrous. A total of four IL-76 cargo planes have been shot down by Ukrainian surface to air missiles. Each of these planes was carrying VDV forces to drop zones to carry out parachute jumps which has meant those planes going down have killed many members of the VDV along with them with each plane carrying 125 paratroops at max capacity. This goes to show the failures of Russian SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) operations and the VDV has paid dearly for it.
Even in ground operations it seems that the unit’s elite status is working against itself. Commanders who do not know the strengths and weaknesses of the unit have been using them in a blunt manner thinking that their better training will allow success. However, specialised training does not necessarily mean “better” outcomes if not implemented intelligently. As such the VDV has taken very high casualties in comparison to other forces. In late April Bellingcat a media organization that collects opensource intelligence to give more accurate pictures of conflicts than regular journalism claimed that the VDV had lost 90% of its paratroops. This number may be inflated but even, so it is undeniable that the VDV has both played the most visible role in Ukraine as well as has taken the largest amount of damage.
Naval Infantry
Russia’s naval infantry is another specialised asset that Russia has at its disposal similar to the VDV. This unit similar to the US Marine Corp and the UK Royal Marines is designed to carry out amphibious assaults on beaches. This unit belongs to the Russian navy even if it is designed to assault a beach and then fight on land. Its naval roots shine through in its uniform. It also has a distinctive Telnyashka similar to that of the VDV but this time the unit’s shirts have black and white stripes and a black beret.
The Naval Infantry have been essential as part of Russia’s expeditionary forces like the VDV. They were involved heavily in Russia’s war in Syria. In 2015 they were involved in heavy fighting with the Islamic State including operations with the Iranian backed para-military Hezbollah. Both the Russian Naval Infantry and Hezbollah’s Special Forces carried out an assault against an IS controlled air base on the 24th of September 2015. The 61st Naval Infantry Brigade was involved in the Syrian governments push to retake Palmyra. They would also play an instrumental role to this day in providing security for the Russian Naval Base at Tartus Syria. There are also reports that the unit was involved in the annexation of Crimea as well as sightings of them operating in the Donbass.
The current war in Ukraine has been an opportunity for the unit to carry out the mission it was trained for like the VDV. There was a successful amphibious landing that was carried out in Mariupol on the 24th of February. Smaller landings have also been seen across the Black Sea coastline by the unit but many observers have called into question how necessary these have been and whether attacks by land would have been as effective. More than likely commanders want to show off their unit’s specific niche even if it is not strictly necessary while they can. There has been talk of a potential landing in Odessa, however, this will not take place for a long time if ever as the Russian army is currently in no position for a land based assault on Odessa.
SSO
The term “Spetsnaz” is often thrown around when talking about Russian special forces, but it is actually a product of Western pop culture more than anything. Spetsnaz is a name that is used to denote a unit as special so rather than a Spetsnaz unit there are multiple Spetsnaz units. For example, the KGB back in the Soviet days had its own Spetsnaz unit similar to that of the CIA Ground Branch or GRS that was used extensively throughout the Soviet Afghan war. The MVD would also have its own Spetsnaz units that would be involved in policing things such as organized crime and counter terrorism within Russia more akin to US SWAT teams. The SSO however is Russia’s main special forces unit.
The unit was established in 2009 and has been involved as the tip of the spear for Russian operations around the world as well as acting in a covert manner when necessary. The unit has seen use both at home and abroad. At home it has been deployed working on counter terrorism operations in Chechnya and was also used to provide security for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Abroad it has been involved in Russia’s counter piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. In 2014 they were disguised among some more regular units such as the Naval Infantry in the annexation of Crimea. Russia like the US, UK and France made heavy use of its special forces throughout the conflict in Syria. The SSO was involved in heavy fighting in Raqqa, Palmyra, Idlib and Aleppo. They also provided security for Putin when he visited Syria in 2017.
In Ukraine this unit has been operating from the shadows but has made some appearances. There are reports that they were involved in the attack on Hostomel airport alongside the VDV. A video also surfaced of them looting food out of a Ukrainian supermarket more than likely due to poor supply lines. The unit seems to be targeting critical military infrastructure to cripple the Ukrainian army’s ability to operate. There have also been reports of special forces operating in civilian clothing and Ukrainian uniforms but we are unsure whether it was the SSO, some of the following units or The Wagner Group.
FSB
The FSB is the successor to the notorious Soviet KGB. This organization is a domestic civilian intelligence organization similar to the UK’s MI5. It monitors organized crime and terrorism and has its own tactical teams that it uses to carry out operations within Russia like some of the FBI swat teams in the US. Its most notorious unit is Alpha team which is Russia’s only tier one unit similar to the US Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) better known as Seal Team 6. As well as counter terrorism and organized crime it also carries out counterintelligence operations where it seeks to discover enemy spies operating within Russia. Despite its domestic nature it does however carry out operations abroad with it operating the above capabilities not just in Russia but across the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This organization spans many countries across Eastern Europe and Central Asia that are Russian aligned. It would seem that the Kremlin also considers every post-Soviet state to also be within the FSB’s permit making it the primary intelligence service for Ukraine.
Like the Rosguard the FSB has been brought in to help the Russian military to police occupied territories in Ukraine and suppressing resistance and civil unrest with its tactical teams. There have been no reports of Alpha team operating in country but more than likely they are there. It would seem from reports from western media that the FSB was put in charge of intelligence gathering in Ukraine prior to the war and there is speculation that there is turmoil between the heads of the FSB and Putin as accurate information was not given. This seems to be supported by the fact that the two heads of the FSB’s foreign intelligence branch Sergey Beseda and Anatoly Bolyukh have both been placed on house arrest by the Kremlin. These two figures were apparently the ones pushing that Ukraine would fall easily the hardest with Putin’s inner circle.
SVR
The SVR unlike the FSB is Russia’s civilian foreign intelligence service similar to the CIA of the US or the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) of the UK. This organization’s goal is to act as an intelligence asset outside of the post-Soviet space. It has been responsible for the widely publicized poisonings of Russian dissidents living in Europe and starting disinformation campaigns to influence Western elections. Even though the FSB is in charge of intelligence gathering in Ukraine Russia’s intelligence agencies are often jockeying for power among each other and with the failure of the FSB there is blood in the water. As such the SVR may try over the next while to gain favour with Putin by potentially taking over some of the functions of the FSB in Ukraine.
Like the FSB the SVR also has its own assault team SVR Zaslon. In 2016 the Russian ambassador to Turkey was assassinated in Ankara. In response to this Zaslon began to be seen by the public providing security for Russian diplomats and government officials on foreign trips that could potentially be dangerous. As seen above with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov being protected by members of this unit. Many observers have wondered if the training that these units have is more than necessary given the job at hand and the speed, they were stood up would hint at some other more secretive use for the unit. As such there is a potential it may be being used in Ukraine but there have been no reports and we probably will not know for a long time.
GRU
The final Russian intelligence agency is the GRU. This is Russia’s Military Intelligence similar to the US DIA and its most prolific intelligence service. It has been involved in operations in Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Moldova, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, The UK, and The United States. Some notable examples of their activity include the assassination of former GRU officer Sergei Skripal in the UK using the nerve agent Novichok, interference in the 2016 US election, carrying out spying on French President François Hollande, and hacking the German Bundestag.
The GRU has also been involved in more conventional conflicts. It lost 300 of its men in the wars in Chechnya and in Syria it had listening bases around to country to monitor SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) including trying to intercept radio chatter from Western forces. It like the other intelligence agencies has its own tactical team GRU Spetsnaz as seen below. The unit has been involved in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass in 2014, Syria and the 2022 war in Ukraine. During the annexation of Crimea, they were seen wearing civilian clothing as seen above and posing as pro-Russian separatists. In Syria they were involved in the fighting in Aleppo and Homs. They have again been brought in to fight in Ukraine. They have been involved in the fighting around Mariupol and have had one officer killed there. The GRU has a history of operating in civilian clothing so the “saboteurs” that the Ukrainians caught operating in Kyiv could potentially have come from the GRU.
Aerospace Forces
In 2015 Russia merged its air force the VKS and its Aerospace Defence Force the VVKO together to create the Russian aerospace forces. This includes three sub-branches the air force, air and missile defence and space forces. The air forces have inherited a lot of equipment from the Soviet Union however in the 90s and early 2000s there was not a lot of money to keep these aircraft operational and many pilots had very little flight time. In the 2008 Russo-Georgian war the air force did not preform to the levels that had been expected and as such reforms were brought in to modernize older soviet air-frames to western fourth generation standards. This would bring Russian aircraft in line with the more modern versions of the F-15, F-16, F-18, and the Eurofighter Typhoon.
Some of the modernization efforts have not been fully in line with western standards. Western aircraft have more of an ability to operate in multiple roles. Modern jets have targeting pods attached to them. These pods provide multiple sensors and cameras to be able to pick up ground targets for attack. Western jets have the ability to scan 360 degrees, mark targets and then engage with smart bombs or missiles. Russian aircraft on the other hand only have targeting pods that face the front of the aircraft. This coupled with the fact that Russia uses mostly dumb bombs means that a jet must be physically lined up to target and then bombs must be dropped on target using gravity alone. This means that Russian planes must drop their munitions from a lower altitude where they are more vulnerable and also the hits, they will make are much more inaccurate. Russia can however hit predetermined targets quite easily such as military bases, buildings, defensive positions, and airfields to name a few. Where Russia struggles is providing effect on target for moving targets or providing air-support to troops in contact where one needs to be precise.
Russia however even with these limitations does have some battlefield experience that it gained in Syria. Two lessons were learned here. The first of these being carrying out air-surface strikes. Many of these were carried out in areas that had civilian presences such as Aleppo. However, even so these gave pilots the experience of flying in hostile territory selecting targets and engaging. The second lesson that was learned was the ability to engage in air-to-air encounters. Syria had contested airspace between the three main powers in the region Russia, Turkey, and the US. One Russian SU-24 was shot down by Turkey when it crossed into Turkish airspace. Apart from this incident no direct engagements happened between the Western powers however there were many close calls including mock dogfights that happened along the Euphrates. The dividing line between Syrian controlled regions and the US backed rebels. This allowed Russian pilots to have the experience of going up against other aircraft especially western ones without the political fallout that would come from a hot confrontation.
The airforce however has not seen the use or the results that it did in Syria in Ukraine. On day one of the conflict Russia attempted to carry out SEAD operations to destroy Ukraine’s air defences. This involved going after Ukraine’s ground-based radars, Ukraine’s surface to air missiles such as the S300 and targeting airfields to try and destroy Ukrainian aircraft on the ground as well as damaging runways. Russia has also used a lot of attack helicopters to provide air support for its troops. These aircraft fly so low that they can be easily targeted by MANPADs such as the Western provided Stinger or the Soviet IGLA as seen below.
The previously mentioned lack of precision guided munitions and targeting pods means that Russian aircraft must fly lower to the ground to make accurate hits on target. This opens them up to attacks from MANPADs that Western aircraft would be able to avoid. The lack of effective air to ground communication has been another large hindrance to the war effort. Western militaries have ground assets such as JTACs. These units are trained to be a link between the air and the ground to direct effective airstrikes on enemy targets. Russia has no such ability which in Syria led to cases of friendly fire. The ability for these assets to work well together allows western militaries to both avoid killing their own and allows them to have better effect on enemy targets. The inability for Russia to provide effective close air support to its troops is a severe hindrance and leads to more Russian casualties.
Russia’s air force has not been able to conduct effective SEAD operations and as such there is still a threat from the ground from systems such as the S300. As such the Ukrainian air force is still flying in limited numbers with two Ukrainian Mi-24s being able to fly into Russia and attack targets there.
The notorious Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 is still flying and attacking Russia equipment in hit and run attacks. These drones have been having a devastating effect on target as seen below.
There has even been footage released of these drones attacking Russian ground-based air defence systems such as the S300 and the Pantsir. This shows a severe issue that persists for Russia. In the 1991 Gulf War the US led coalition was able to carry out SEAD operations and gain air superiority over Iraqi forces on the first day of the conflict. Russia on the other hand has not been able to establish this just over two months into the war in Ukraine.
Russian Navy
The Russian navy has been the most important and least important factor in the war in Ukraine. Much of the war centres around control of the Black Sea. The port at Sevastopol is one of the most important ports Russia has for global power projection. Despite this the navy has been acting in more of a support role throughout the war. The most important of these roles has been logistic support. The navy allows Russia to carry a lot of heavy equipment into Ukraine’s underbelly in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. This is however limited as Turkey has stopped Russia from getting its ships through the Dardanelles. As such the Russian Black Sea fleet cannot leave the Black Sea and none of Russia’s naval assets in the rest of the world can access the Black Sea.
The second asset that the navy provides is an offensive capability. Russia has been using its cruise missiles to substitute the lack of precision guided missiles of the air force. Cruise missiles use a system known as inertial navigation. This uses a combination of GPS, flight time, gyroscopes, speed, and altitude to guide a missile to target. These can be very accurate from a long distance but can only hit static targets such as buildings. These have been used throughout the war, but they were most effectively used on the first day of the conflict to hit Ukrainian military installations all around the country.
Russia has taken navy losses in this war. NATO has been flying drones over the Black Sea as well as having satellites positioned overhead. The intelligence sharing between NATO and Ukraine has allowed Ukraine to hit some of Russia’s naval assets with their own missiles. Russia’s navy is much smaller than that of NATO and as such its ships are designed to be light and fast and to be armed to the teeth to carry out hit and run attacks on NATO. This however has come at a disadvantage for Russia as when hit they cannot sustain the damage that other counterparts would. As such when the Ukrainians managed to hit Russia’s flagship in the Black Sea the Moskva a fire spread within the ship that ended up sinking it. Russia has also lost one of its amphibious assault ships in Berdyans'k as seen below.
This ship was apparently seen in a video uploaded to social media by the Russian government showing it offloading military equipment at the port. From that Ukraine was able to target it with a cruise missile strike and sink the ship. As such the Russian navy has been taken significant losses despite its uncontested control of the Black Sea but none of these engagements are going to sway the war in any meaningful way.
Brilliant article.